Trafford Publishing: Buster: A Canadian Patriot and Imperialist - The Life and Times of Brigadier James Sutherland Brown.

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Buster: A Canadian Patriot and Imperialist - The Life and Times of Brigadier James Sutherland Brown.

by Atholl Sutherland Brown

240 pages; quality trade paperback (softcover); illustrated; catalogue #04-0350; ISBN 1-4120-2522-2; US$25.28, C$32.00, EUR20.80, £14.41

Brigadier James Sutherland Brown was well known to a limited segment of the Canadian public. Later he became known to a larger segment which, rightly or wrongly, made him an icon of anti-Americanism.

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About the Book About the Author Table of Contents and Excerpts Catalogue Information

About the Book

Buster is a biography of James Sutherland Brown, CMG, DSO, a distinguished Canadian soldier who advanced from boy bugler to Brigadier General. He was noted for his organizational and planning abilities as well as his humane command. As Assistant Quartermaster General of the 1st Canadian Division he was substantially responsible for the rapid advance of the Division through Mons, Beligium, to the Rhine in the last 100 days of WWI. He also provided for the efficient demobilization of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1919-20. As Director of Operations and Intelligence he was the author of Defence Scheme No.1 designed to defend Canada in case of an attack by United States in the 1920s, a plan that has been mocked by academic historians but praised by his colleagues.
As District Officer Commanding in Victoria during the Great Depression he managed on a slim budget to get military facilities built and the Militia as prepared as possible in anticipation of WWII. He then lost a confrontation with his immediate superior, General McNaughton, centred on the humane treatment of the unemployed in Relief Camps in the 1930s and consequently he resigned. Though he sought one, he was refused a role in WWII as a result of this clash.

About the Author

Atholl Sutherland Brown was born in Ottawa in 1923, the third son of James and Clare Sutherland Brown. He lived in London for a year as a child but grew up and lived much of his life in Victoria, Canada. He was a pilot in Burma with 177 Beaufighter Squadron in 1944-1945 and was awarded the DFC in 1945, after the war he became a geologist with a PhD from Princeton University. He was a research geologist with the BC Geological Survey and its chief geologist for ten years.

Table of Contents and Excerpts

Jame did not know it at the time but this was his farewell to the Regiment. Although he disguised it well he was quite an emotional man. All his service career, and afterwards until his death, he bore a great love for the Regiment, his brother officers and the troops from his batman, Pte. Quick to the Regimental Sergeant Major. Little things like his tattoo of the regimental crest on his forearm exhibited his attachment. Whether this was drawn following high jinks after a mess party or in sober circumstances hardly matters. More importantly, his affection was shown in July 1928 when he was struck off strength of the Regiment after having been a member of it or nominally of its reinforcement satellite, the Nova Scotia Regiment, ever since he left in 1913. His letter in 1928 to Lt. Col. E.A. Seely Smith, the current CO states:
"I have just received the Gazette, with mixed feelings, [noting] I have been struck off strength of the old Regiment... on promotion to Colonel... . I assure you my heart, my thoughts and my efforts have always been with the Regiment. Not only with the serving [personnel] but also with the vast number of my ex-members whom I have constantly come into contact... personally or by letter... . I hope the [authorities] will continue to show me in the list of old soldiers entitled: 'Removed from the Regiment and still on the active list.' I assure you, the officers and men of the Regiment that wherever I am; my best wishes will be with you all and any small influence I have will always be at the command of the Regiment as also will be my best endeavours to advance its course... . I visited with pleasure and interest the depot of the Gloucestershire Regiment [an affiliated regiment] at Bristol last January and intend the Territorial Battalions in competition next month. Kindest regards [to all]."²¹ This letter was circulated to all ranks in the Regiment and Seely Smith responded to James that "all members of the Regiment are heartily sorry to see your name taken off the Regiment list."

The Advance to Mons and the March to the Rhine
The 1st Division then went into rest and reserve until 12 October. When the Division again entered the fray it was slightly north of where it finished, positioning itself for advance from Douai to Mons, the important Belgian coal and industrial town. In retreat the Germans laid waste to the Belgian countryside, stripping it of all farm animals and destroying all the bridges, canal lock and flooding the country. Even so their retreat was rapid, and it was difficult for the Canadians to keep in contact with them. Supply under such circumstances was the major problem. As Currie said of this: "Because the advances were so substantial, [the] enormous logistical demand was hard to anticipate and supplies and replacements had to be moved further and faster to be at the right place at the right time."²⁹

Division headquarters moved daily. Although this and the supply problems became routine it still involved Buster and his men in a lot of work which was carried out very efficiently. In fact, the war of movement was completely different and introduced many more variables in the problems of supply. ³⁰ Nevertheless, the Q staff of the Canadian Corps and particularly the 1st Division, Buster and staff, coped so well with the problems they set and example of how this should be handled.³¹
The corps had orders not to engage the enemy but to bypass him if he put up any serious resistance. Casualties were to be avoided, contrary to Sam Hughes' assertions. During this advance many of the senior staff had brief leaves including General Macdonell who returned on 23 October. The Prince of Wales lunched at Division HQ on 27 October after which Buster left on his leave returning a month later, well after Armistice was declared on 11 November. He had been with Clare in London for the enthusiastic celebration including attending plays such as Chu Chin Chow. The war was over and most thought the Allies troubles were about to end. Buster was amongst those that didn't think so, as his thoughts over the next few years reveal.
When he returned to the front Buster's chief challenge was arranging supplies for the rapidly advancing Division during it's 'March to the Rhine' The transport system had been significantly destroyed even in Germany. The columns' paths were through the Ardennes in France and the Eifel in Germany, both of which were dissected hilly terrain with a paucity of roads. Furthermore, these regions were already substantially short of food because of the naval blockade and the scorched earth policy of the enemy. At least ammunition was not much of a problem any more and the weather was fine until the end of the month. The troops' spirits were high even though they were short of rations during their rapid rough march and frequently forced to sleep at night in wet bivouacs. Still, with victory at hand and the prospect of survival real, the first agitations to get home arose.

The defence of Canada against an attack by the USA would have been a formidable undertaking. Buster's approach held considerable risk of failure but as he said, a purely defensive approach was certainly doomed to failure. Buster's knowledgeable colleagues agreed. For example, Major General George Pearkes, VC, in 1929 Buster's GSO 1, and later Minister of Defence in the Diefenbaker government, is quoted by Taylor as saying, "It was a fantastic, desperate plan but it might have just worked. The Americans had very few troops close to the Border. We might have been able to divert their forces to the flanks, and to hold them out of central Canada until Britain intervened, or second thoughts prevailed in Washington."³⁷
It appears there were no alternative proposals to Buster or the senior staff of NDHQ to change the plan. The scheme, under the conditions proposed, was probably as good as could have been developed. Failure of the CGS or the former Inspector General to inform the Minister, the PM and Cabinet, and get them on side in regard to the need of a strong militia, bore seriously upon the possibility of a successful defense. The question of the possible intentions of the USA in the early and mid 1920s caused alarm in the senior staff of NDHQ even if it didn't with the government's advisor's on foreign affairs such as Loring Christie and O.D. Skelton. ³⁸ Perhaps if these advisors knew what modern day historians know about American offensive planning they too might have been alarmed.³⁹ At the same time DS No.1 was drafted the US War Plans Division drew up a series of offensive plans with one directed against Britain (Red) and Canada (Crimson). Richard Preston of Duke University has stated, "Colonel Sutherland Brown's Defence Scheme Number One does not appear quite so ludicrous against this background [of American plans]."... "In the 1920s, when memories of the First World War were bitter and when Canada's economy was sliding into the Great Depression, Brown's [DS No.1] may have kept the Militia alive."⁴⁰

Hard Times
In 1933 Buster's world became unstitched. The collapse of the New York Stock exchange of Thursday, 24 October 1929 did not immediately have full impact on Canada. The consequent Great Depression developed somewhat slower in this country, even if it was eventually deeper and more severe than in most western countries. Buster was not affected directly by the Crash because he had few investments, however, he soon felt the sharp edge of hard times himself. The effects that impinged on him were mostly beyond his control. The first was the progressively restricting budgets for the army under his command. This was soon followed by the ten percent salary cuts across the board for officers. Then, at the end of 1932, as a result of General McNaughton's influence on the Prime Minister, the Military Districts became responsible for setting up and administrating camps for unemployed single men. One third of these men were in British Columbia which already had a camp system. Although Buster was a great organizer he faced a real problem because the BC camps had generous provisions and required little work compared to the Spartan ideas the NDHQ had in mind. McNaughton and Buster had completely different philosophies concerning the camps. Consequently, the existing rift between Andy and Buster quickly became wider and more serious, particularly for Buster.

Epilogue
The Introduction of this biography asked whether James Sutherland Brown was a hero as Charles Taylor inferred in his recollection of my father and which I slowly came to believe. Will other agree? His life confirmed bravery and skill in his chosen role that advanced him near to the peak of his profession without his showing much hubris. From there he certainly suffered reversals of fortune by which heroes are tested, and he emerged from them without becoming bitter, morose or vindictive. He was an approachable beer-drinking hero to the old sweats and his colleagues admired is skills, bravery and directness in peace as much as war. His flaws were there for all to see as he made no attempt to hide them.
To military historians Buster's life is of interest in a number of ways. Many of them have placed much emphasis in their writings that the CEF in WWI and the Canadian Army in WWII were amateur armies, an inflated Militia, and that the PF played a minor and not very distinguished role. For the first comment it could scarcely have been otherwise considering the numbers and the expansion in both conflicts. Nevertheless, many followed Sam Hughes in depreciating the permanent force, but with little justification. There were hardly better regiments on either side of the Western Front that the 'shino boys' of the RCR or the PPCLI. Also the PF produced a proportionate number of senior leaders such as Generals MacBrien, Macdonell and Morrison. Unquestionably too, most of the senior Militia officers owed their capability to training and preparation by the PF. Buster more than most represented both sides. He had a long history in the Militia and believed throughout his life that Canada needed a substantial active reserve rather than being burdened with a mid-sized standing army. He did all he could to support and encourage the Militias as well as the Navy and Air Force, especially when he was a DOC. At the same time he thought the nation needed a well-trained professional army as a core from which growth and leadership should spring during an emergency. He was exceptionally proud of the RCR believing it was all a good infantry regiment should be. Other regiments such as the PPCLI, Lord Strathcona's Horse and the Canadian Dragoons were in his estimation, only slightly less good.
Buster has been characterized as a colonel blimp by some academic historians as well by newspaper columnists who reflected and exaggerated their views. Both groups revel in portraying army commanders and strategists as dwelling in the past by preparing for yesterday's battles or misidentifying the potential enemy.¹⁰ It is doubtful that such charges are true of Buster for through reading, correspondence with General Fuller and attendance at Tank Corps exercises in England, he showed greater interest than most of his Canadian contemporaries in armoured forces. He also encouraged cavalry regiments to have trucks mocked up as armoured cars in his field exercises. Furthermore, while he was DOC he constantly stressed combined operations training and conducted some of his colleagues called innovative field exercises. He advocated improving the defence of Vancouver by forts in Johnston Strait of Juan de Fuca. He certainly was more concerned than most of his colleagues about the fragility of the lines of communication in the Fraser Canyon. In addition, Buster was a strong and consistent supporter of an adequate and indepedent Air Force. If Buster did dwell in the past it was because he was a consummate reader of military history. He may not have been an admirer of the USA but he was an expert on their Civil War.

Catalogue Information