Trafford Publishing: Northwest Sea Disasters: Beyond Acceptable Risk

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Northwest Sea Disasters: Beyond Acceptable Risk

by Leif Terdal & John Keiter

151 pages; quality trade paperback (softcover); illustrated; catalogue #04-2007; ISBN 1-4120-4200-3; US$17.99, C$22.00, EUR14.30, £9.91

Beyond Acceptable Risk reports on ten Northwest sea disasters of charter boats and commercial fishing vessels, and points out guidelines for safety at sea for recreational boaters and commercial operators.

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About the Book About the Author Excerpts Catalogue Information

About the Book

Northwest waters off Oregon and Washington pose unique dangers to boaters. All of the navigable bars that a boater must cross to reach the ocean, such as the Tillamook Bay Bar, the Columbia River and Depoe Bay are hazardous. When a boat is in danger or actually sinks, the Coast Guard comes to the rescue. Search and rescue itself poses hazards, often times compounded by delayed or inaccurate distress calls from the captain. In addition the captain may fail to provide timely communication and leadership to crew and passengers during the crises. This book reviews the sinking of five charter boats. Four of them, the Pearl-C, Cougar, Gambler, and the Taki-Tooo accounted for the greatest loss of life in the charter boat industry in Oregon and Washington. Survivors of these charter boats provide vivid and dramatic accounts of the sinkings and search and rescue. We also review the sinking with the loss of life of the Aleutian Enterprise in the Bering Sea, crab boats off the Oregon and Washington coast, as well as the loss of the Sea King during a storm as it was being towed across the Columbia River bar. We focus on the human element in decision making during emergencies at sea, and provide guidelines for boaters to consider their own experiences at sea with respect to safety. An understanding of the hazards on our Northwest waters are important to recreational boaters who go on their private boats to fish off shore.

About the Author

Leif Terdal: Leif is a lifelong boater. He fished commercially for salmon off the Oregon and Washington coast for 14 years and published Fishing Beyond the Buoys, as well as Small Boat Cruising to Alaska. As owner and operator of a salmon troller, he has crossed the Columbia River bar and the Garibaldi bar over 700 times. He remains interested in safety at sea and conservation efforts to preserve habitat for salmon and all wildlife. He retired from the Oregon Health Sciences University after 30 years as a clinical psychologist. Upon his retirement, he named his new boat Second Effort, as a metaphor for his new phase of exploration.

John Keiter: John was born in Portland, Oregon and has had a love for the ocean all his life. He is a teacher and educational researcher. Learning about boats and the ocean has led him to desire that individuals come to know more about boat safety.

Excerpts

Michael L. Dorsey, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard Commander, Coast Guard Group Ketchikan

The topic of your book is of great interest to us, both as a historic reference and as a teaching aid. Coast Guard Group Ketchikan will be happy to review our records, as you have requested.

Denton Rickey Moore, Author, Gentlemen Never Sail to Weather (two editions), Alaska's Lost Frontier.

I read this book with considerable interest. The material is certainly well documented. While each of the vessel sinkings with loss of life is tragic in its own right, the stories have two common themes - unseaworth vessels and human error. The book is about those losses and some of the lessons we have learned.

Jon Brown, Owner and operator of the charter boat Kerri-Lin.

This book is a great read! I have crossed the Tillamook Bay Bar over 3,800 times. I have a policy that when the bar is too rough, I cancel the trip before leaving the dock. When at sea, should conditions become hazardous, I have my passengers put on life jackets.

Jo Bailey and Carl Nyberg, Authors and Publishers, Gunkholing Specialists

Beyond Acceptable Risk is an absolute must-read for all recreational and commercial mariners, guests or passengers before venturing out in any vessel in northwest waters. It is a fascinating and frightening look at sea disasters off the Pacific Northwest coast, most caused by a combination of sea conditions and human error, even though the skippers were experienced commercial operators. First-hand accounts by survivors detail the gripping horrors of the sinkings and loss of family members. Terdal and Keiter, both experienced fishermen who have crossed dangerous northwest bars hundreds of times, point out serious hazards unique to our Northwest waters and document huge advances over the years that have the potential for increased safety and comfort for pleasure cruising and commercial fishing.

Russell Jackson, Ph.D., Sport Fisherman

One of the major reasons for my move to Oregon 35 years ago was my avid interest in sport fishing. My first trip out of Garibaldi, Oregon, was cancelled because of rough bar conditions. Sensing my disappointment at a missed opportunity to fish, my fishing partner took me to the North Jetty and pointed out the bar and dangerous surf conditions. I saw immediately I had a lot to learn. This book is a must read for every fisherman. Each of us must be ever vigilant as we decide on every trip into the ocean what is "acceptable risk."

J. Albert Browder, M.D., Sport Fisherman

I encourage all small boat operators and their passengers who go into the open ocean to read this book and to follow the detailed advice offered in Chapter nine, Lessons from Tragedies.

INTRODUCTION: BEYOND ACCEPTABLE RISK

In each example of a sea disaster carefully described in this book, the captain was an experienced commercial operator of a fishing vessel or charter boat. Commercial crab fishermen and deep sea fishermen face special hazards because they go to sea and remain at sea during the fall and winter when storms with strong winds are common in Pacific Northwest waters. In addition their vessels are vulnerable to capsizing because their fishing operations require heavy superstructure and gear on and above deck that makes their vessels less stable. Current safety regulations, monitored and enforced by the Coast Guard, are designed to ensure what can be considered a level of acceptable risk for commercial fishermen. Commercial fishermen are absolutely forbidden to take passengers on board and permit them to sport fish on any trip where commercial fishing takes place. One reason is that the level of "acceptable risk" is different (i.e., lower) than for charter boats that take passengers out for sport fishing trips.

Charter boat captains who operate documented vessels have considerable leeway in determining when and under what ocean and bar conditions they can safely take passengers on ocean fishing trips. They also have leeway in deciding when to recommend that passengers wear life jackets. They are required, however, to orient passengers prior to each trip about location and use of life jackets. The life jackets must be in a location that provides immediate access. Furthermore, the charter boat captain must have on board a plaque that describes what passengers should do in the event of an emergency.

The focus in this book is on human error in which established guidelines and prudence are not followed. In some cases tragedy occurred in spite of reasonably safe (or at least manageable) sea conditions. In other examples difficult sea conditions combined with human error to lead to a tragedy. Chapter 8 shows the power of the Columbia River bar, which from time to time has brought tragedy in spite of 2 valiant and persistent rescue efforts. In our focus on human error we consider two broad categories of error:

1. Serious error(s) before the fateful day of the disaster. In a general sense this means that the captain has not made adequate preparation for the demands that can be expected for the trip or voyage. Examples include going to sea in an unseaworthy boat (or a boat that has been neglected through lack of maintenance), not having required safety gear on board, or not providing adequate orientation and instruction about safety measures to passengers or crew prior to the trip. The captain may believe, or have an attitude, that certain rules do not apply to him and thus feels no obligation to follow them.

2. Impaired leadership during the crisis. When a crisis develops the captain may fail to show effective leadership, and his inaction or flawed actions compound the problem. Communication problems are the most common examples. The captain may provide inaccurate information in a distress call to the Coast Guard (or nearby vessels), or may not provide effective directives to passengers or crew as to how best to handle the situation. The captain may be so preoccupied with one problem that he fails to monitor his vessel (or changing weather or sea conditions) to be alert to potentially more serious problems. In some cases the captain literally "shuts down" and becomes totally uncommunicative as if overwhelmed by the crisis.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SINKING OF THE TAKI-TOOO GARIBALDI, OREGON June 14, 2003

The Taki-Tooo, a 35-foot charter boat, left the marina at the Oregon coastal town of Garibaldi at 6:30 AM. On board were 17 passengers and a crew of two. The skipper, Doug Davis, was experienced with decades of fishing this area and had probably well over a thousand crossings of the Tillamook Bay bar. He had previously owned the Taki-Tooo and the company Garibaldi Charters, but had recently sold the company to Mick Buell. Garibaldi Charters had earned a solid reputation in the Northwest because of its skilled skippers and well maintained boats. Charter fishing at Garibaldi offers passengers access to good fishing for salmon and a variety of bottom fish like lingcod, sea bass and other species.

I began my investigation of the capsizing of Taki-Tooo in February 2004. Garibaldi and the Tillamook Bay bar were very familiar to me as I had owned and operated a salmon troller there. At the Garibaldi boat basin I met Chris Benke and asked about Taki-Tooo. He said that he had assisted with the rescue, but he advised me to contact David Logston, who also provided major assistance and recorded notes about the rescue. He, and other commercial fishermen I met at the boat basin, also suggested I contact Jon Brown, who witnessed the accident.

Weather and bar conditions

The weather at the Oregon coast was fine on June 14, for the start of Fathers Day weekend. The skies were partly cloudy, the temperature was mild and there was little wind. However, the ocean had long ocean swells 8' to 12' and the bar was rough. The ocean swells were the result of a strong storm off the coast of northern British Columbia and Southeast Alaska. The Coast Guard issued a warning of high surf and rough bar conditions at 3:30 AM that morning and declared tillamook Bay bar closed to all recreational boaters as well as to charter boats that had not been inspected and approved for heavy surf conditions. The Taki-Tooo was inspected and approved for heavy surf conditions.

Three minutes to disaster

At 7:15 AM, Davis opened the throttle on his engines and took his boat away from the protected area just inside the rough bar and headed out through the dangerous waters. He encountered waves 6 to 10 feet. He then hit a larger wave that sent green water and spray over his boat, turning his boat north. His boat was then hit by a huge wave that rolled the boat over. Other waves hit the boat, rolling it over and over again. Jon Brown (as stated above) watched in stunned silence as the charter boat, similar to his own, and full of passengers, rolled over like laundry in a front loader washing machine. Of the seven passengers who survived, in this section we share detailed accounts of what it was like for five of the survivors: Mark Hamlett and his two sons Chris and Dan, Brian Loll and Tyler Bohnet..

Mark Hamlett and sons Daniel and Chris retell the story

Mark Hamlett was standing next to the fl ying bridge of the Taki- Tooo at eye level to Doug Davis, the skipper, as he was circling about waiting for a break in the rough seas. Together they watched the D&D charter boat go out with no apparent difficulty, although the skipper did not radio back any report. Mark Hamlett expressed his concern to Doug Davis. He said, "Many times when the bar is rough there will be a brief lull in the strength of the waves, only to be followed by some much stronger and dangerous waves." Mark added, "I have seen that happen many times when I used to troll commercially out of Brookings, Oregon, some 30 years ago." Nevertheless, just moments later and without any announcement to the 17 passengers, Davis opened the throttle and headed out to cross the Tillamook Bay bar. Moments later Mark Hamlett saw a very large wave. He quickly went down from the flying bridge to the cabin below. It was not spray from a splash of a wave he was worried about. Instead, he anticipated green water crashing over the boat - and that is what happened.

When I met Mark Hamlett at his home in Southeast Portland, he suggested that I first talk with his two sons about the accident and then he would give his account. Daniel Hamlett was 18 at the time, and Chris, his brother, was 23. Other family members aboard were Brian Loll, who is married to their sister, and Edward Loll, Brian's father.

Chris' account

We had been circling around for about 45 minutes, and I was sitting on the engine box at the back of the boat. I went inside to make a cup of coffee. As I was inside the cabin, we began moving out (to go across the bar). I was sitting on the Port side looking out the window drinking my coffee, when all of a sudden I saw a wave getting bigger and bigger. I looked up to see what the captain was going to do. He was headed for a chute to go through, so we were sideways to the wave. I heard my friend Brian, my sister's husband, scream, "Oh my God!"

Then the crush! Everything got crazy. People were slamming into each other as we were tossed about. I got caught between the table and everything broke apart. I was sort of knocked out. Then I came too and needed air. I got air and then I lost air. It was like being in a big washing machine. You see stuff in a movie like that, and you think it will never happen to you.

Sometimes I don't want to think about it. I try not to think too much about it. It was like a freak accident. Maybe he (the skipper) was wrong, but you can't blame someone for something like that. I don't know. Maybe he could have turned back. It doesn't make sense. We were going to go out to catch fish and we couldn't catch fish that day. Instead, we lost half of our new acquaintances and part of our family. It was a dramatic turn of events, and now all the headaches with the insurance and money. It doesn't make sense. The people who lost family won't even get enough money to cover funeral expenses. My mother would have been hysterical if she had lost her husband and her two sons. I don't like to think about it.

At this point I asked Chris if he could tell me about being in the cabin and how he and the others got out and to the beach.

The most shocking part was the wave coming over the boat and we were suddenly upside down. It was tumble, tumble, tumble. The boat was rolling and water was splashing around. We found air pockets for a little bit, but most of the time we were trapped. We found air space when the boat sort of settled and kind of floated with the waves. I thought we were dead immediately. Honestly. When we were about to crash all I could hear was "Oh No! Oh No!" People started screaming and then the crash. Finally, as the boat churned the windows broke. The cabin was filling up with water, but now there was a way out. We were able to escape. My dad found the life jackets and distributed them. He had been rummaging around trying to find them, but the boat was upside down half the time.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SINKING OF THE ALEUTIAN ENTERPRISE DUTCH HARBOR, ALASKA March 22, 1990

The last haul of the Aleutian Enterprise

Captain Mark Siemons radioed the AAFC station at Dutch Harbor on the morning of March 22 and stated that his vessel, after 20 days at sea, was nearly at capacity with processed and frozen cod and that they should be back at Dutch Harbor sometime on March 23. One more haul of fish should complete his goal of returning with a full load of fish. About 1:00 PM the captain ordered the big trawl net to be retrieved.

As the front section of the trawl net came within 200 feet of the vessel stern, the captain saw that the large net was entirely full of cod. He called, using a loud hailer, to all those on deck to come to the stern of the trawler to see what was coming aboard. Doug Wilcox, a deck hand, ran to his locker to get his camera. He hoped to get a photo of a successful fishing operation that would earn him a cash prize, if published in "View from the Bridge," an AAFC in-house publication.

Captain Siemons watched as the deck hands continued to haul the huge load of cod onto the Aleutian Enterprise. He was oblivious to the fact that the cod-end and the intermediate portions of the net carried up to 100,000 pounds of fi sh in excess of the tonnage capacity of his vessel. The Aleutian Enterprise was already at near full capacity of processed and frozen fish. Furthermore, the load came on board the vessel off center, toward the port side. Additionally, the net failed and in seconds dumped a huge portion of the load on the deck. The vessel, which was already leaning to port, shuddered, and the entire load on deck shifted to the port side.

Very concerned about the sudden list of his vessel, Siemons radioed at 1:35 PM to another AAFC vessel, the Northern Enterprise, that he had taken on an unusual list never experienced before. The Northern Enterprise quickly retrieved its own trawl net and proceeded directly to the Aleutian Enterprise. The severe list steadily became worse, prompting the captain to again call the Northern Enterprise to exclaim that the Aleutian Enterprise "was going down fast!" The second call was placed within two minutes of the fi rst.

The crisis facing the Aleutian Enterprise: Load shift plus alpha error

The load shift brought on by the huge tonnage of fish sliding to the port side of the vessel caused the vessel to shift sharply to the port. The list was serious, but by itself was not suffi cient to cause the loss of the vessel or loss of life. Unfortunately, the ramifi cations of two human errors were in place before the load shift occurred. One error involved a modifi cation of the ship that made it unseaworthy; the second error was the complete lack of safety training for the twenty men who worked as fish processors.

Vessel modification

When a fishing ship the size of the Aleutian Enterprise is fully involved in catching and processing fish, a huge amount of fish heads, skins and guts must be discharged simultaneously with the processing of the fish fillets. For convenience and to speed up the fish processing, the ship had been modified with the addition of four through-hull openings on the port side of the vessel. Three openings were 12" by 18", and another was 18" by 24". Conveyer belts flushed out fish wastage through these openings. These openings on the port side of the vessel were well above the water line during normal operations. These major modifications to the hull on the port side of the vessel were made without consulting with a marine architect or engineer. When the hull listed to the port by 20 degrees, all of these openings were below the water line. permitting relentless and catastrophic flooding to occur. It was not possible to close these discharge chutes against the incoming torrent of water. The modification to the Aleutian Enterprise seriously compromised the seaworthiness of the vessel.

Absence of safety training aboard the Aleutian Enterprise

None of the employees who worked at the fish processing section of the vessel had received instructions as to the locations of survival suits or how to use them. Furthermore, the survival suits were not located in places where access was readily available, but were contained in storage lockers often behind or underneath other objects. In addition, the crew had not received instructions or drills in how to abandon a sinking vessel.

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